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 I. Introduction 
 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) regulates the nation’s problem 
banks using supervisory actions, specifically Consent Orders and Cease & Desist 
Orders. Whenever a bank or its management is using unsafe and unsound banking 
practices such that the bank’s continued existence is called into question and its 
CAMELS1 rating falls to a 4 or below, the FDIC issues a public supervisory 
action with a list of corrective actions that bank management must take. The 
banks that are currently under a supervisory action form the ‘problem bank list’. 
When the bank’s management has improved the bank’s financial position and 
operating procedures as specified in the enforcement action, the bank is taken off 
of the list. This chain of events raises the question of whether the bank’s 
management is simply satisfying the conditions of the supervisory action or is 
internalizing the safe and sound operating procedures developed while under the 
watchful eye of the FDIC. If the former is the truth, we would expect the bank’s 
condition to quickly deteriorate after removal from the list, while if the latter 
holds, we would expect a positive effect on the bank’s performance in the near 
future. 
CAMELS ratings and FDIC Reports of Examination are nonpublic 
information, which has limited the scope and volume of prior research about the 
FDIC. Indeed, according a paper published by Delis et. al. in 2013, “…pending 
the present paper, no research has gathered raw data on enforcement actions by all 
three U.S. bank supervisors (FDIC, OCC, FRB) and assessed their correlation 
with bank behavior after taking into account their classification according to the 
underlying rationale and their relevance to bank safety and soundness.” (Delis, 
Staikouras, & Tsoumas, 2013). As part of the authors’ work, they sort supervisory 
actions into four classes based on their severity and conduct econometric tests to 
attempt to recover the causal effect of supervisory actions on bank performance. 
The authors find that the most severe sanctions (class 1) do result in an overall 
decline in the risk-weighted assets ratio; however, this comes at the cost of an 
increased volatility in performance and a heightened risk of insolvency. As the 
authors state, “class 1 sanctions remain pretty risky.” (Delis, Staikouras, & 
Tsoumas, 2013) 
 A paper published by the FDIC’s Division of Research and Statistics finds 
that enforcement actions lead to a statistically significant increase in performance 
of areas over which bank management has control (Curry, O'Keefe, Coburn, & 
Montgomery, 1999). This report analyzes both the effect of a downgrade to a 
CAMELS rating of 4 and the effect of a supervisory action on bank performance, 
as measured by the Provision for Loan and Lease Losses and Net Loan and Lease 
Charge-offs. CAMELS ratings are nonpublic, so outside researchers are unable to 
replicate their results. However, their findings with regards to bank performance 
are in contradiction to those of Delis et. al. 
                                                
1 CAMELS stands for the six components that the FDIC rates: Capital, Asset Quality, 
Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to Market Risk. Each component is rated on a 
score of 1-5, with 1 being the best and 5 and the worst. A weighted average of the CAMELS 
score, also on a 1-5 scale, indicates the final rating of a bank’s safety and soundness. 
  The existing papers on the efficacy of the FDIC solely investigate the 
immediate effect of being placed under a supervisory action. I expand on their 
research and examine the effect of being removed from a supervisory action on 
bank performance. I find a statistically significant positive effect of removal from 
the problem bank list on return on assets up to three years from removal, and a 
positive but statistically insignificant effect thereafter. Additionally, I recover the 
causal effect of external capital markets on return on assets, as well as some of the 
internal management effect. There remains a positive unexplained effect of 
removal from the problem bank list on bank performance that I leave to further 
research.  
 
II. Theory & Model 
 
The null hypothesis is that bank management is simply complying with the 
FDIC’s legal requirements while under the effect of a supervisory action and 
resuming business as usual once the regulators leave. If this hypothesis holds, we 
would expect to see a negative correlation between being taken off of the problem 
bank list and a bank’s performance. Falling returns on assets (ROAs) are 
correlated with the advent of a supervisory action (Delis, Staikouras, & Tsoumas, 
2013), so the termination of an enforcement action that raised ROA should result 
in a leveling off and declining ROA. Additionally, if this hypothesis is correct, the 
most significant predictor of ROA should be the ROA in the prior quarter; thus, I 
will control for the prior ROA in my regressions. 
 The alternative hypothesis is that, through some mechanism, the FDIC 
promotes positive and permanent change in the banks that it engages heavily with 
while under the effect of a supervisory action. If this hypothesis is correct, 
terminating the supervisory action will have a positive or neutral effect on the 
bank’s return on assets. If the estimates resulting from the regression support this 
hypothesis, there are two potential causal channels that could be driving it. First, it 
could be that management internalizes the safe and sound banking practices 
enforced by the FDIC while under the supervisory action and continues these 
practices after the action is lifted. Alternately, the improvement in performance 
could be entirely due to outside effects; investors and depositors, seeing that the 
FDIC has effectively ‘approved’ the current practices of management relative to 
what they were before the supervisory action, demand less of a risk premium on 
their deposits and investments.  
 Distinguishing between the two channels presents an econometric 
challenge: the majority of banks in the United States are not publicly traded, so 
obtaining data on corporate governance or other indicators of management’s 
internal performance is difficult or impossible. However, the ‘outside effects’ 
channel can be easily be measured by looking at each bank’s cost of capital.  
 Given the constraint that not all of the banks in my sample are publicly traded, I 
use interest expense as a percent of average assets to control for the cost of 
capital. If investors and depositors are reacting to the publicly available news that 
the bank is no longer considered a problem bank, then they should demand less of 
a risk premium on their deposits and the bank’s interest expense should go down, 
all else equal. If the magnitude of this effect is sufficient to explain most of the 
variation in ROA under the alternative hypothesis, then I will conclude that the 
effect of the FDIC on the performance of problem banks works through external 
rather than internal channels. 
 
III. Methodology and Data 
 
The estimating equation is: 
 !"#!,! = !!! + !!!!,! + !!!!"#$!,! + !!!!"#!!! + !!!""#!$!,!+ !!!"!#$%&"%'%(!!,! + !!!"#$%&'%()'!,!+ !!!"!#!$%&$!,! + !!!"#!,! + !!!"#$%&!,! + !! + !! + !!,! 
 
 This equation demonstrates the idea that a bank’s return on assets should 
be determined by its previous return on assets, the number of months since it was 
removed from the problem bank list, bank-specific control variables, and firm and 
quarter fixed effects. Specifically, ROA (or return on assets) is a bank’s net 
income in quarter t divided by its average assets that quarter. X represents a 
vector of quarter dummy variables that indicate how long it has been since the 
bank was removed from the problem bank list. For example, if a bank i was 
removed from the list in quarter t-4 and it is currently quarter t, the dummy for 
‘four quarters since removal’ would take a 1 and the dummies for all other 
quarters for that bank i would take a value of zero in quarter t. 
 To control for economies of scale in the banking market, I include SIZE, 
the natural log of the bank’s average assets in quarter t (Nichols, Wahlen, & 
Wieland, 2005). Next, I include a lagged return on assets; the previous quarter’s 
return on assets should be positively correlated with both the current return on 
assets and with being removed from the problem bank list, so including it should 
reduce any upwards bias of the coefficients of X. ALLRAT, or the ratio of the 
Allowance for Loan Losses to Average Assets, is negatively correlated with 
return on assets; banks that have to set aside more money to write off bad loans 
should experience a reduction in performance. Likewise, the current ALL should 
be negatively correlated with lagged ROA, so including it should result in less 
downward bias in the coefficient on lagged ROA. NONPERFORMRAT, or the 
ratio of nonperforming assets to total assets is included for the same reasons as 
 ALLRAT; it reflects the level of unprofitable loans or other negative effectors of 
ROA. 
 RBC, or the risk-based capital ratio, is negatively correlated with return on 
assets; if a bank is holding more capital, it is not putting that capital to use earning 
more profits. The direction of the correlation between RBC and being taken off of 
the problem bank list is not immediately obvious; on one hand, supervisory 
actions typically require banks to maintain a capital ratio above the legal limit, so 
being removed from the problem bank list may result in a lower RBC. On the 
other hand, managers may attempt to continue to maintain or improve their RBC 
after being taken off of the list if they fear further enforcement actions by the 
FDIC. This would result in a positive correlation between RBC and ROA. 
Whichever channel dominates, including RBC in the regression will account for 
it. DEPOSITSRAT, the ratio of total deposits to total assets, and NONINTRAT, 
the ratio of noninterest income to total income, are included due to their positive 
correlations with both current and lagged ROA. Additional motivation for 
including all of the above controls is seen in Delis et. al. (2013) as these variables 
“have been shown to have a significant impact on bank capital, risk, and 
performance measures in the banking literature.” I complete the regression with !! 
and!!!, firm and quarter fixed effects. 
 I draw the data for bank-level controls from the Call Reports, quarterly 
statements of financial condition that all U.S. banks file electronically with the 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). Accompanying the 
Call Reports are Uniform Bank Performance Reports, or UBPRs; these are 
standardized reports that include bank-specific performance ratios such as ROA 
and RBC in an easily accessible format. The FFIEC provides Call Reports and 
UBPRs for bulk download for every quarter dating back to 2003.  
 The FDIC provides aggregate information on Enforcement Decisions & 
Orders for bulk download on its website. While the bulk data do not contain 
specific details of each supervisory action, the data do indicate the class of the 
supervisory action was. I limit the dataset to only include the dates of termination 
of Consent Orders and Cease and Desist Actions, the most severe cases. In doing 
so, I exclude relatively minor infractions such as penalties for misstatement of the 
Call Report and penalties for violating the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. I 
combine the two datasets by filing date and RSSD ID, a unique identifier 
permanently attached to each financial institution. 
I exclude the bottom and top one percent of ROA from the regressions. As 
can be seen in Figure 1, the large majority of ROA lies clustered around zero with 
a few outliers in the tens of thousands; a typically expected ROA is in the range of 
-3% to 3%. In Figure 2, I graph ROA against assets; the outliers are all clustered 
around firms that, for a variety of reasons, have a zero or near-zero asset base. As 
a result, any change in earnings is drastically magnified. These observations are 
 not indicative of the typical bank, so I exclude the top and bottom 1% of ROA 
(6,815 observations). I create a new dependent variable, ROArev, with a 
distribution seen in Figure 3. After accounting for missing items, I am left with an 
unbalanced panel dataset of 314,456 observations of 9,717 banks from 2003 to 
2013; summary statistics for the data are presented in Table 1, with complete 
variable definitions available in Table 2. 
 
Figure 1 – Outliers in Return on Assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Return on Assets -v- Assets 
 
  
 Figure 3 – Revised ROA without Outliers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
RBC 339,264 12.24 45.19 -15.32 21,370 
ROA 339,263 -0.216 205.2 -76,470 3,350 
ALLRAT 334,102 0.519 0.492 0 20.49 
SIZE 334,102 8.027 1.497 0 16.92 
DEPOSITSRAT 334,102 46.49 42.05 0 14,597 
NONINTRAT 339,183 0.135 0.313 -39.48 80.07 
NONPERFORMRAT 333,890 1.497 2.847 0 100 
ROArev 332,479 0.800 1.103 -6.634 5.420 
      
Number of Obs 9,717 9,717 9,717 9,717 9,717 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2 – Data Definitions 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Shorthand Definition 
Unit of 
Measureme
nt Source 
ROA Return on Assets. Equal to (Net 
Income) / (Average Assets) 
Percent FFIEC 
UBPR 
ROArev Equal to ROA with the bottom and 
top 1% of the distribution dropped. 
Percent FFIEC 
UBPR 
INTEXP Interest Expense. Equal to (Interest 
Expense) / (Average Assets) 
Percent FFIEC 
UBPR 
INTEXPrev Equal to INTEXP with the bottom 
and top 1% of the distribution 
dropped. 
Percent FFIEC 
UBPR 
ALLRAT Allowance for Loan Losses. Equal to 
(ALL)/(Average Assets) 
Percent FFIEC 
UBPR 
SIZE Natural log of (Average Assets) Percent FFIEC 
UBPR 
DEPOSITSR
AT 
Deposits Ratio. Equal to (Deposits) / 
(Average Assets) 
Percent FFIEC 
Call 
Report 
NONINTRAT Noninterest Income. Equal to 
(Noninterest Income)/(Total Income) 
Percent FFIEC 
Call 
Report 
NONPERFO
RMRAT 
Nonperforming Assets Ratio. Equal 
to (Nonperforming Assets) / 
(Average Assets) 
Percent FFIEC 
Call 
Report 
RBC Risk-Based Capital Ratio. Equal to 
(Total Capital) / (Risk-Weighted 
Assets) 
Percent FFIEC 
UBPR 
RBCrev Equal to RBC with the bottom and 
top 1% of the distribution dropped. 
Percent FFIEC 
UBPR 
OffQ# Dummy variable. Takes a value of 1 
during quarter t if bank i was 
removed from the problem bank list 
in quarter (t-(#-1)). 
Dummy FDIC 
ED&O 
 IV. Empirical Results 
 
There is a statistically significant positive effect of being taken off of the problem 
bank list on ROA. As Table 3 (see Appendix) shows, there is an average increase 
in ROA of approximately 10 to 20 basis points in the first three years after being 
removed from the problem bank list. I include a series of regressions to assess the 
relative importance of the two causal channels. Regression 1 includes only the 
vector of quarter dummy variables. Regression 2 adds lagged ROA as a control. 
Regression 3 adds variables to control for management’s effect on ROA, and 
Regression 4 adds interest expense to control for the market’s reaction to a bank’s 
removal from the problem bank list. 
 I report the results of Regression 2 in Figure 4. I construct a 90% 
confidence interval using the coefficients on the quarter dummies and their 
reported standard errors. Polynomial trend lines highlight the movement of the 
coefficients and the confidence interval. Figure 5 reports the results of adding 
management controls, and Figure 6 reports the results of adding interest expense. 
All of the trend lines are reported together in Figure 7 for comparison. Graphs 
only extend to 30 quarters due to an almost complete lack of significance of 
coefficients outside of that time horizon. 
 The lagged value of ROArev has the largest and most statistically 
significant effect on ROA; including the lag raises the R2 of the regression from 
0.089 with no controls to 0.592. The coefficient on the lagged value of ROArev 
indicates an average rise of 71 basis points of ROArev for every 100 basis point 
rise in lagged ROArev. The channel through which RBC affects ROA is unclear; 
while RBC is significant at the 5% level in the final regression, the estimates 
indicate only a 0.3 basis point drop in ROArev for every 100 basis point increase 
in RBC. Interest expense has a negative effect on return on assets: for every 100 
basis point rise in interest expense, ROArev drops by 13 basis points on average. 
Importantly, including interest expense as a control consistently lowers the 
magnitude of the quarter dummy coefficients by 1-2 basis points. 
   
V. Discussion 
 
The estimation results indicate that on average, ROA remains 10 to 20 basis 
points higher than it would otherwise be for the first 3 years following the 
termination of a supervisory action against a problem bank. For the first three 
years following the termination of a supervisory action, the positive direction of 
the coefficients and their significance are robust to including both management 
and capital markets controls. The regression estimates do not clearly indicate the 
causal channel through which ROA is increased at banks that were once on the 
problem bank list. 
 Figure 4 – The Effect of Termination of a Supervisory Action on Return on Assets 
Lagged ROA and Quarter Dummies 
 
This figure reports the both the 90% confidence intervals and coefficients of the quarter dummies indicating how long it has been since the 
removal of a bank from the problem bank list. This regression includes only the quarter dummies and lagged ROA as predictors of ROA. A 
lower bound on the confidence interval above zero indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.  
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 Figure 5 – The Effect of Termination of a Supervisory Action on Return on Assets 
Lagged ROA, Management Controls, Quarter Dummies 
 
This figure reports the both the 90% confidence intervals and coefficients of the quarter dummies indicating how long it has been since the 
removal of a bank from the problem bank list. This regression includes the quarter dummies, lagged ROA, and management controls as 
predictors of ROA. A lower bound on the confidence interval above zero indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.  
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 Figure 6 – The Effect of Termination of a Supervisory Action on Return on Assets 
Lagged ROA, Management Controls, Interest Expense, Quarter Dummies 
 
This figure reports the both the 90% confidence intervals and coefficients of the quarter dummies indicating how long it has been since the 
removal of a bank from the problem bank list. This regression includes the quarter dummies, lagged ROA, management controls, and interest 
expense as predictors of ROA. A lower bound on the confidence interval above zero indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.  
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 Figure 7 – The Effect of Termination of a Supervisory Action on Return on Assets 
All Regressions Combined 
 
This figure reports the both the 90% confidence intervals and coefficients of the quarter dummies indicating how long it has been since the 
removal of a bank from the problem bank list. The trend lines from Figures 4, 5, and 6 are reported together for comparison. 
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  As demonstrated in Figure 7, including a battery of bank-specific controls 
as a proxy for bank management’s actions in regression 3 has an ambiguous effect 
on the coefficients of the quarter variables. The coefficients rise by 1-3 basis 
points during the first 15 quarters since removal from the problem bank list, but 
drop by 1-3 basis points during the second 15 quarters. The coefficients’ 
statistical significance stays approximately the same, becoming insignificant at 
the 10% level after approximately 12 quarters. Over the time range when the 
coefficients are significant, controlling for management actions results in an 
increase in the coefficients. The average rise in coefficients on quarter dummies 
resulting from controlling for management effects in the first 12 quarters since 
removal from the problem bank list is 1.64 basis points, or 15.5% of the average 
coefficient. Over a thirty-quarter time horizon, the average rise is only 0.96 basis 
points, or 8.8% of the average coefficient for the same time frame. 
 Interest expense is not a perfect proxy for the cost of capital for non-
publicly traded banks. The fact that the FDIC insures all deposits to $250,000 
means that bank deposits are a risk-free investment. However, for purposes of this 
regression, I treat the risk premium asked by depositors at problem banks as an 
annoyance premium. While it is true that no one will lose their money at a bank 
that fails, there is a cost in terms of time and effort in dealing with a failed bank. 
The rational consumer should, all else equal, demand an interest rate premium in 
exchange for the possibility that they will have to go through the trouble of 
changing all of their deposit accounts to a new bank and deal with getting their 
money back. The interest expense ratio also includes interest that banks pay on 
non-deposit funding sources such as bonds. As such, the interest expense ratio 
adequately reflects the cost of capital. 
 Including interest expense in the regression consistently lowers the 
coefficients on the quarter dummies by 1-2 basis points, as seen in Figure 7. This 
is consistent with the hypothesis that depositors and holders of bank debt take the 
removal from the problem bank list as a signal that the FDIC has effectively 
certified the safety and soundness of the bank’s operations. Depositors and 
holders of bank debt demand less of a risk premium on their holdings with the 
bank, and so interest expense falls. By controlling for interest expense in 
regression 4 but not regression 3, I estimate the effect that the change in the risk 
premium has on ROA for banks that are removed from the problem bank list. The 
average drop in coefficients for the first 12 quarters since removal from the 
problem bank list is 1.68 basis points, or 13.9% of the average coefficient on the 
quarter dummy variables for the same time period. Over a thirty-quarter horizon, 
the average drop in coefficients is 1.39 basis points, or 12.8% of the average 
coefficient on the quarter dummy variables for the thirty-year period. 
 
 
 VI. Conclusion 
 
Coming off of the FDIC’s problem bank list is associated with a 10-20 basis point 
increase in return on assets for approximately three years. These results are robust 
to including a variety of control variables, including management actions and 
capital markets reactions. Post-removal capital markets reactions result in an 
average 1.7 basis points increase in return on assets, consistent with the 
hypothesis that depositors and investors are lowering the risk premium that they 
demand on deposits. Post-removal management actions result in an average 1.6 
basis points decrease in return on assets in the three years following removal from 
the problem bank list, which may indicate that management has not fully 
internalized safe and sound operating procedures.  
 
Figure 8 – Distribution of Duration Since Termination of a Supervisory Action 
 
Further research should seek to identify more firm-specific characteristics 
that account for the remainder of the unexplained change in return assets 
following the removal from the problem bank list. A longer timeframe may also 
indicate that this unexplained effect lasts for a longer period of time. Figures 4 
through 6 show that the drop in significance of the coefficients on the quarter 
dummies is primarily due to increasing standard errors, not decreasing 
coefficients. Figure 8 illustrates the distribution of quarter dummy variables that 
take a value of 1. The terminations of enforcement actions are semi-randomly 
 distributed throughout the timeframe of the data set, and so there are many more 
banks that have been off of the problem bank list for a short period of time than 
there are banks that have been off of the list for a long period of time. Performing 
the same regressions over a longer period of time will result in more banks that 
have been off of the list for a longer period of time. This larger sample size will 
lead to smaller standard errors, which may increase the significance of the 
coefficients on the quarter dummy variables over a longer timeframe than is 
presented here. 
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IX. Appendix 
 
Table 3 –Regression Results: The Effect of Termination of a Supervisory Action 
on Return on Assets 
 
This table provides regression results for the primary regression in this paper: the effect of being 
removed from the problem bank list on return on assets. Regression (1) uses only the dummy 
variables that indicate how long a bank has been off of the problem bank list to predict ROA. The 
dummy variable OffQ# takes a value of 1 if bank i was removed from the list in quarter t -(#-1). 
(2) adds lagged return on assets, and (3) adds bank-level controls to control for management 
actions. (4) adds interest expense to control for capital markets reactions. Robust standard errors 
appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  No Controls Controls With Interest 
VARIABLES No Controls Lag Lag Expense 
     
L.ROArev  0.712*** 0.664*** 0.658*** 
  (0.00341) (0.00500) (0.00504) 
INTEXPrev    -0.134*** 
    (0.00630) 
RBCrev   0.00124 -0.00325** 
   (0.00138) (0.00139) 
ALLRAT   -0.126*** -0.132*** 
   (0.0178) (0.0179) 
SIZE   0.0255*** 0.0407*** 
   (0.00904) (0.00912) 
DEPOSITSRA
T 
  0.00127*** 0.00148*** 
   (0.000185) (0.000191) 
NONINTRAT   0.247*** 0.243** 
   (0.0943) (0.0951) 
NONPERFOR
MRAT 
  -0.0454*** -0.0453*** 
   (0.00556) (0.00560) 
OffQ2 0.204** 0.0865 0.108* 0.0892 
 (0.0929) (0.0564) (0.0590) (0.0588) 
OffQ3 0.290*** 0.149** 0.161** 0.146** 
 (0.0947) (0.0697) (0.0638) (0.0643) 
OffQ4 0.264*** 0.0453 0.0734* 0.0588 
  (0.0956) (0.0587) (0.0396) (0.0400) 
OffQ5 0.304*** 0.100** 0.117** 0.0993** 
 (0.0840) (0.0499) (0.0475) (0.0479) 
OffQ6 0.366*** 0.152*** 0.150*** 0.136*** 
 (0.0854) (0.0488) (0.0514) (0.0514) 
OffQ7 0.446*** 0.159*** 0.199*** 0.183*** 
 (0.0894) (0.0509) (0.0464) (0.0470) 
OffQ8 0.384*** 0.108** 0.147*** 0.123** 
 (0.0940) (0.0547) (0.0522) (0.0525) 
OffQ9 0.447*** 0.124** 0.132** 0.118** 
 (0.101) (0.0506) (0.0545) (0.0545) 
OffQ10 0.514*** 0.165*** 0.170*** 0.152*** 
 (0.106) (0.0550) (0.0563) (0.0575) 
OffQ11 0.472*** 0.110*** 0.112** 0.0950** 
 (0.0943) (0.0407) (0.0436) (0.0442) 
OffQ12 0.353*** -0.00509 0.0378 0.0220 
 (0.114) (0.0680) (0.0570) (0.0584) 
OffQ13 0.343*** 0.0695 0.0524 0.0347 
 (0.128) (0.0605) (0.0643) (0.0654) 
OffQ14 0.500*** 0.191*** 0.195*** 0.180*** 
 (0.123) (0.0646) (0.0676) (0.0678) 
OffQ15 0.409*** 0.0521 0.0359 0.0177 
 (0.145) (0.0613) (0.0681) (0.0685) 
OffQ16 0.442*** 0.101 0.0855 0.0711 
 (0.148) (0.0688) (0.0749) (0.0738) 
OffQ17 0.484*** 0.109* 0.101 0.0849 
 (0.127) (0.0579) (0.0623) (0.0620) 
OffQ18 0.345** 0.0232 0.0292 0.0154 
 (0.145) (0.0793) (0.0767) (0.0759) 
OffQ19 0.459*** 0.169*** 0.161*** 0.151*** 
 (0.117) (0.0455) (0.0515) (0.0516) 
OffQ20 0.405** 0.191*** 0.165*** 0.149*** 
 (0.157) (0.0562) (0.0574) (0.0569) 
OffQ21 0.309* 0.115* 0.0972 0.0799 
 (0.175) (0.0640) (0.0627) (0.0616) 
OffQ22 0.365** 0.0475 0.0338 0.0159 
 (0.170) (0.0799) (0.0774) (0.0764) 
OffQ23 0.452** 0.170* 0.158 0.138 
 (0.182) (0.0896) (0.0962) (0.0958) 
OffQ24 0.413** 0.103 0.106 0.0928 
 (0.182) (0.0763) (0.0751) (0.0753) 
 OffQ25 0.395** 0.0978 0.0674 0.0535 
 (0.156) (0.0952) (0.101) (0.101) 
OffQ26 0.236 0.0467 0.00120 -0.0166 
 (0.168) (0.0735) (0.0787) (0.0803) 
OffQ27 0.442*** 0.198** 0.148** 0.137* 
 (0.140) (0.0801) (0.0751) (0.0745) 
OffQ28 0.508*** 0.151* 0.105 0.0911 
 (0.162) (0.0830) (0.0865) (0.0873) 
OffQ29 0.494*** 0.144*** 0.106* 0.0928* 
 (0.141) (0.0527) (0.0556) (0.0561) 
OffQ30 0.286* -0.0391 -0.0623 -0.0196 
 (0.160) (0.0811) (0.0816) (0.0614) 
OffQ31 0.269 0.0184 0.0101 0.00619 
 (0.174) (0.0731) (0.0723) (0.0716) 
OffQ32 0.238 0.0778 0.0550 0.0360 
 (0.183) (0.0905) (0.0942) (0.0957) 
OffQ33 0.286* 0.111* 0.0956 0.0772 
 (0.160) (0.0619) (0.0628) (0.0649) 
OffQ34 0.366** 0.179** 0.144* 0.123 
 (0.167) (0.0791) (0.0787) (0.0794) 
OffQ35 0.469*** 0.181** 0.168** 0.155** 
 (0.170) (0.0738) (0.0754) (0.0763) 
OffQ36 0.450*** 0.126** 0.140*** 0.127*** 
 (0.159) (0.0572) (0.0485) (0.0490) 
OffQ37 0.321* -0.0213 -0.0331 -0.0447 
 (0.169) (0.0842) (0.0830) (0.0809) 
OffQ38 0.178 -0.0419 -0.0635 -0.0758 
 (0.195) (0.130) (0.137) (0.136) 
OffQ39 0.196 0.0883 0.0535 0.0401 
 (0.179) (0.0765) (0.0788) (0.0783) 
OffQ40 0.162 0.0905 0.0480 0.0354 
 (0.185) (0.0835) (0.0853) (0.0864) 
OffQ41 0.0922 0.00127 -0.00432 -0.0196 
 (0.236) (0.115) (0.123) (0.125) 
OffQ42 0.0865 0.0465 0.0499 0.0338 
 (0.215) (0.0759) (0.0732) (0.0722) 
OffQ43 0.329 0.155* 0.192* 0.183* 
 (0.217) (0.0855) (0.101) (0.104) 
OffQ44 0.342 0.149 0.0975 0.0942 
 (0.216) (0.105) (0.0918) (0.0923) 
OffQ45 0.187 -0.0424 -0.0137 -0.0161 
  (0.193) (0.0986) (0.106) (0.106) 
OffQ46 -0.0331 -0.0424 0.227 0.220 
 (0.332) (0.294) (0.169) (0.176) 
OffQ47 -0.321 -0.163* -0.142 -0.148 
 (0.346) (0.0974) (0.0955) (0.0971) 
OffQ48 -0.519 -0.183 -0.0759 -0.0752 
 (0.390) (0.180) (0.122) (0.125) 
OffQ49 -0.365 0.135 0.251 0.246 
 (0.429) (0.211) (0.187) (0.182) 
OffQ50 -0.192 0.123 0.245 0.239 
 (0.399) (0.186) (0.154) (0.153) 
OffQ51 0.0610 0.0164 0.0413 0.0345 
 (0.222) (0.0820) (0.0739) (0.0752) 
OffQ52 -0.0483 0.00682 0.0238 0.0140 
 (0.214) (0.0721) (0.0654) (0.0622) 
OffQ53 -0.317 -0.168 -0.137 -0.150 
 (0.277) (0.223) (0.287) (0.298) 
OffQ54 0.00773 0.231 0.294 0.287* 
 (0.250) (0.180) (0.182) (0.174) 
OffQ55 0.134 0.124 0.121 0.118 
 (0.270) (0.138) (0.133) (0.136) 
OffQ56 0.0615 0.0298 0.0334 0.0390 
 (0.386) (0.164) (0.197) (0.185) 
OffQ57 0.193 0.00787 0.0913 0.0667 
 (0.172) (0.0416) (0.0726) (0.0643) 
Constant 1.028*** 0.335*** 0.183** 0.349*** 
 (0.00844) (0.00508) (0.0751) (0.0750) 
     
Observations 332,479 321,579 311,643 308,560 
R-squared 0.089 0.592 0.606 0.607 
Number of 
certno 
9,983 9,888 9,628 9,627 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
